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Regulators vs. markets: Do differences in their bank risk 
perceptions affect lending terms? 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We quantify the differences between market and regulatory assessments of bank portfolio risk, 
showing that larger differences significantly reduce corporate lending rates. Specifically, to 
entice borrowers, banks reduce spreads by approximately 4.1% following a one standard 
deviation increase in our measure for bank asset-risk differences. This amounts to an interest 
income loss of USD 1.95 million on a loan of average size and duration. The separate effects 
of market and regulatory risk are much less potent. Our study reveals a disciplinary-
competition effect in favor of corporate borrowers when there is information asymmetry 
between investors and bank regulators. 
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1. Introduction 
Financial markets and bank regulators both monitor the solvency of banks, disclose 
information, and discipline misconduct in order to achieve banking and financial stability. 
Despite markets and regulators being the two most important banking disciplinary 
mechanisms, their assessments on bank (solvency) risk levels may diverge significantly, 
implying a significant source of asymmetric information (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). 
This type of asymmetric information, and the resulting differences in risk perceptions, creates 
uncertainty for the players involved in bank lending, especially in the case of large systemic 
banks and loans of substantial amount. Is this uncertainty systematically priced or accounted 
for in bank loan contracting? Does it affect the structure of loan deals? This paper seeks to 
answer these questions by focusing on large corporate loan deals made in syndicated loan 
markets around the world. 
 Markets use all available information, including information disclosed by bank 
regulators, to form their perceptions of overall bank risk. Regulators, on the other hand, focus 
on accounting-based measures and other operational reports obtained directly from the banks 
under their supervision to derive bank ratings but also increasingly use auditing and market-
based measures. In the presence of low information asymmetry, markets and regulators should, 
in principle, agree in their evaluations of healthy and transparent banks. In contrast, relatively 
high levels of information asymmetry, whether caused by forces endogenous or exogenous to 
bank operations, might cause considerable disagreement between markets and regulators, 
implying higher uncertainty regarding the financial health of a bank. 
The syndicated loan market is an excellent laboratory for examining the potential 
effects of different risk perceptions of market and regulators on bank lending. In the presence 
of significantly differing bank risk perceptions, a syndicate’s lead bank (the one making the 
important decisions regarding lending, including finding borrowers and participant lenders and 
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setting the lending terms) might need to exert additional effort to “convince” corporate 
borrowers and participant lenders to actively engage. This especially holds when the markets’ 
assessments on its risk level is higher than the regulator’s. We hypothesize that this act of 
convincing results in two observable outcomes for the banks under scrutiny: 1) banks offering 
more competitive (lower) loan spreads to assure borrowing firms that their interests are being 
served and 2) banks expanding the syndicate to reduce information asymmetry for borrowing 
firms and other participant banks.  
 To test these hypotheses, we first calculate the difference between the market and 
regulatory estimates of bank portfolio risk, henceforth referred to as “portfolio risk 
differences.” For market risk, we use the volatility of bank asset returns derived from option 
pricing theory (e.g. Ronn and Verma, 1986; Flannery and Rangan, 2008; Vallascas and 
Hagendorff, 2013). For regulatory risk, we use the risk-based capital ratio, which bank 
regulators most often examine because it reflects a bank’s portfolio risk vis-à-vis the capital 
available to support the bank’s risk-related choices. This ratio is jointly determined by the bank 
and its supervisors and is subject to supervisory approval, even in cases where the bank’s 
economic capital exceeds regulatory capital requirements (Basel Committee, 2017). 
Subsequently, we estimate the differences in portfolio risk between the two measures from the 
residuals of their bivariate regression and use these residuals to explain lending terms 
(primarily, the loan spread over LIBOR to assess the direct effects on firm financing costs) and 
syndicated loan structures (e.g. the share of lead banks in the loan and loan concentration).  
Our dataset includes more than 40,000 syndicated loan deals over 2002–2016. In 
addition to the theoretical advantage of using syndicated loans to test our central hypotheses, 
there are at least two practical advantages. First, most of the banks participating in this market 
are listed, allowing for the market-based measure of portfolio risk. Second, the loan-level data 
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allow the use of several layers of information, for banks, firms, and loans, in our tests, making 
it easier to identify causal effects. 
 We recognize that the uncertainty resulting from the divergence between the market-
based and regulatory estimates of portfolio risk is only one of many sources of information 
asymmetry that shapes bank-lending decisions. An additional source includes asymmetric 
information stemming from a bank’s overall or idiosyncratic exposure to firm credit risk which 
is usually evident in the formation of a syndicate and the loan share of its lead bank (Sufi, 2007; 
Ivashina, 2009). Since our aim is to identify a causal effect between portfolio risk differences 
and bank loan terms/syndicate structure, proper identification rests on correctly addressing this 
alternative source of information asymmetry. 
We achieve this through several tests. Importantly, the loan-level data and the 
observation of repeated lending to the same firm within a given year allow using firm times 
year fixed effects. These fixed effects control for any alternative time-varying demand (firm) 
side explanations for our findings. We also control for certain loan characteristics, including 
the number of lenders in a syndicate, the number of participant banks, and the syndicate’s 
concentration, all of which capture information asymmetry within the syndicate (see Sufi, 
2007). In even more stringent specifications, we control for general evolving economic 
conditions alongside other conditions in the lender’s and borrower’s countries via lender’s and 
borrower’s countries times year fixed effects, as well as quarter effects to control for common 
global effects on all banks and firms. We conduct several additional tests, including the use of 
Heckman-type models to account for selection issues between banks and firms, and use of 
alternative measures of portfolio risk differences. 
We find that, ceteris paribus, loan spreads on drawn funds decrease by an economically 
significant 4.1%, or 11.2 basis points, in response to a one standard deviation increase in our 
measure of portfolio risk differences (market risk above regulation risk). This amounts to 
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approximately USD 0.39 million less in annual interest income for a loan of average size, 
increasing to USD 1.95 million over the loan’s duration for a loan with an average size and 
duration. Given that each lead bank in our sample extends approximately 26 loans per year 
while retaining a 29% loan share, the mean annual foregone interest soars to USD 2.95 million. 
Notably, the negative effect of these risk differences is mainly concentrated in banks 
perceived to be higher risk by markets, with banks perceived to be riskier by regulators not 
experiencing a significant effect on their loan spreads. We show, however, that the difference 
between risk perceptions is what has the greatest effect, and not the two perceptions separately. 
This is the key finding of our paper, highlighting the operative and disciplinary role of market 
forces in banking supervision, which materialize when there are conflicting bank risk estimates 
between investors and supervisors.  
We further enhance our identification approach for a supply-side effect of portfolio risk 
differences by looking into bank heterogeneity with respect to financial health. We thus 
hypothesize that the negative effect of portfolio risk differences should be less potent for more 
financially sound banks. We examine this hypothesis using models with interaction terms 
between our measure of portfolio risk differences and measures of banks’ financial health. 
Besides highlighting relevant heterogeneity in the results, these models further enhance our 
identification of a supply-side mechanism driving our findings (e.g., Jimenez, Ongena, Peydro, 
and Saurina, 2014). We indeed find that this is the case for more profitable banks, with better 
credit ratings, and lower levels of non-performing loans. We also show a significantly lower 
role for portfolio risk differences in explaining loan spreads when there is a recently established 
bank–firm relationship.   
Portfolio risk differences can also exacerbate changes in the structure of the loan 
syndicate. In light of large portfolio risk differences for lead banks, these banks must convince 
borrowers. One way to provide incentives is through the formation of a more dispersed 
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syndicate with the lead bank retaining a smaller share of the loan. The reason is that such 
syndicates can provide a certification effect, minimizing adverse selection and subsequent 
moral hazard concerns regarding the lead bank’s solvency risk. We show that the negative 
overall effect of portfolio risk differences on loan spreads is significantly contained by reducing 
the loan share of a syndicate’s lead bank and forming wider, less concentrated syndicates.  
Section 2 describes the conceptual framework and places our study within the existing 
literature. We develop three testable hypothesis on the effect of portfolio risk differences on 
loan spreads and how this effect can be heterogeneous with respect to lead banks’ financial 
characteristics, relationship lending, and changes in syndicate structure. Section 3 presents our 
dataset and discusses our identification strategy. Sections 4, 5, and 6 report and discuss the 
empirical results. Section 7 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Conceptual Framework and Hypotheses Development 
2.1. Conceptual Framework and Contribution 
Our theoretical priors for the effect on bank loan terms of the differences between regulatory 
and market estimations of bank risk are threefold. First, regulatory estimates of bank portfolio 
risk have long been inconsistent with market-based estimates. After extensive consideration, 
risk-weighting methodology for assessing minimum regulatory capital requirements under 
Basel I and II has been broadly determined to be unable to accurately reflect the degree of risk 
attached to bank portfolios (Kim and Santomero, 1988; Avery and Berger, 1991; Jones, 2000; 
Hellwig, 2010; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). 
Specifically, early studies following the introduction of the Basel Accord show that the 
ratio of a bank’s risk-weighted assets to total assets is negatively related to the capital holdings 
of banks in the U.S., with no effect on bank portfolio risk (e.g., Jacques and Nigro, 1997). 
These findings are reinforced by evidence that the predictive ability of risk-adjusted capital 
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ratios for U.S. bank failures is not necessarily higher than that of non-weighted capital to asset 
ratios (Estrella, Park, and Peristiani, 2002). Since the transition to Basel II from 2007 onwards 
in major lending countries (except for the US), there have been few notable improvements on 
this front, with risk-weighted assets shown to be poorly matched to the market measure of bank 
portfolio risk: bank asset volatility (Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013). Moreover, markets are 
incapable of exerting a thorough disciplining effect. This is particularly apparent when banks 
substitute equity with debt, as the presence of debt investors help to reduce moral hazard by 
bank managers (Ashcraft, 2008).  
Second, we build on the literature surrounding the heterogeneous response of banks in 
supplying credit according to their levels of capital. In general, well-capitalized banks supply 
more expensive loans (Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and Marquez, 2014; Dell’Ariccia, Laeven, and 
Suarez, 2017), especially those with higher liquidity risk through the holding of illiquid assets 
(Acharya and Naqvi, 2012). Existing evidence further suggests that higher bank capitalization 
results in increased bank risk-taking and a consequent increase in loan spreads, an effect 
magnified in a loose monetary policy environment (Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis, 2017; 
Paligorova and Santos, 2017). By anchoring bank capital (the regulatory-based perception of 
bank risk) to market-based estimates of bank risk, we examine whether portfolio risk 
differences also matter (on top of a bank’s level of capital) in bank credit supply decisions and 
the determination of loan spreads.  
 Third, connecting the first two lines of consideration, we aim to uncover an important 
but so far overlooked source of information asymmetry between bank supervisors and bank 
investors in their conflicting measures for bank portfolio risk. Our study is the first to examine 
whether the size of these risk differences is inversely related to the loan rates offered by banks, 
with our priors suggesting that banks with significant portfolio risk differences offer discounted 
rates on their corporate loans in an attempt to entice borrowing firms and thereby maintain their 
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market share. If this hypothesis holds, these banks are expected to see reductions in their 
interest income.  
 
2.2. Hypotheses Development 
In theory, differences in loan pricing arise as a consequence of asymmetric information 
(Besanko and Thakor, 1987; Chan and Thakor, 1987; Sharpe, 1990). In line with most theories 
of asymmetric information, the key source of informational asymmetry postulated here is the 
asymmetry arising between bank supervisors and markets. Supervisory authorities carry out 
on-site inspections in order to examine bank operations and determine bank compliance with 
legislative and supervisory requirements. By law, supervisory authorities have outright 
flexibility in conducting on-site inspections and collecting any information deemed necessary 
for performing their duties in ensuring that each regulated institution holds capital resources 
commensurate with its risk profile. Off-site inspections are an integral component of the 
supervisory process, providing supervisors with information on both current and impending 
issues within an institution that may not have been otherwise detected between scheduled on-
site inspections. The end result of these inspections is the establishment of capital adequacy 
requirements to help supervised banks absorb significant unforeseen losses. By construction, 
these requirements reflect the supervisory evaluation of the economic risks associated with 
bank portfolios. 
 A large body of theoretical and empirical literature suggests that capital requirements 
affect bank capital ratios and that, due to deviations from the assumptions of the Modigliani-
Miller theorems, a shortfall of capital relative to the target capital ratio may result in a 
downward shift in bank loan supply (e.g., Berger and Udell, 1994; Peek and Rosengren, 1995; 
Gambacorta and Mistrulli, 2004; Francis and Osborne, 2012). These individual capital 
requirements are a combination of the minimum capital standards as defined in the Basel 
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Framework and unique supervisory assessments that reflect judgment on risk management 
practices as well as a bank’s corporate governance or market conditions. 
 However, as banks continue to become more adept at innovating beyond the boundaries 
of existing regulation, policy makers are looking to the marketplace as a potential additional 
monitor of bank risk-taking (see Flannery 1998, 2001; Furfine, 2001). In fact, existing studies 
on whether market information is a useful component of bank regulation and supervision report 
that in many circumstances, supervisors and markets are complementary sources of 
information on bank operations and solvency risk (De Young, Flannery, Lang, and Sorescu, 
1998; Peek, Rosengren, and Tootell, 1999; Berger, Davies, and Flannery 2000). 
Thus, market-based risk estimates emerge as a valuable supplement to traditional 
regulatory and supervisory practices, largely due to the market’s forward-looking character and 
ability to quickly incorporate new information. For example, many economic agents take 
corrective action based on information inferred from the changing market price of securities 
(Bond, Goldstein, and Prescott, 2009; Francis, Hasan, Liu, and Wang, 2019). Upon receiving 
these price signals, the market can penalize banks for excessive risk-taking by raising the cost 
of external funding (indirect influence) or influence bank operations so as to reduce the banks’ 
risk exposure (direct influence).  
Despite this, intermediation and agency theories suggest that greater uncertainty 
regarding banks is inevitable. As “delegated monitors,” banks are expected to lend to 
information-intensive borrowers, although lending to opaque borrowers may cause opaque 
banks (Diamond, 1984; Morgan, 2002). This opacity further reflects the extremely high level 
of debt and low level of equity in bank capital structure, which acts as an incentive for a bank 
to take excessive risk. The increasing complexity of large banking organizations requires high 
levels of expertise and sophistication among private lenders to meaningfully assess bank risk 
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profiles (Flannery, 1998; Gilbert, Meyer, and Vaughan, 1999; Francis, Hasan, Liu, and Wang, 
2019).  
In practice, regulatory monitoring based on capital requirements is not sufficient to 
address banks’ moral hazard concerns (Hellmann, Murdock, and Stiglitz, 2000). Banks 
typically hold opaque assets, while their financial conditions change over time (Flannery, 
Kwan, and Nimalendran, 2004); as such, regulatory discipline (including capital requirements) 
often lags behind bank operations, and strict bank capital requirements may create greater 
moral hazard problems (Besanko and Kanatas, 1993; Anginer, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Mare, 
2018). On the other hand, supervisory access to inside information on a bank’s condition may 
be superior for two reasons: a supervisory authority can force managers to reveal information, 
while a single supervisory authority does not suffer the coordination (free rider) problems 
associated with having many fragmented stakeholders (Flannery, 1998).  
Our basic premise is that portfolio risk differences reflect the presence of asymmetric 
information regarding the true level of bank portfolio risk and can ultimately affect the way a 
bank organizes its financing arrangements. The public information made available to the 
markets has an additional effect on loan spreads driven by the degree of information asymmetry 
between the lending bank and the borrowing firm.  
We expect this effect to be more prevalent when market-based estimates of bank 
portfolio risk are higher than regulatory estimates, as the communication of these estimates of 
higher risk reflects new information made available to the market. Unexpected (negative) 
developments regarding the creditworthiness of a bank increases the cost of asymmetric 
information and may consequently raise market concerns about the bank’s ability to conduct 
business. Investors, who have instantaneous access to this new information, might adjust their 
estimates, and the affected banks are likely to try even harder to entice borrowers when 
negotiating the syndication of a new loan in an attempt to ease market concerns regarding bank 
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solvency. This additional effort might take the form of competitive loan terms, primarily 
reflected in lower loan spreads and secondarily in non-price terms such as reduced collateral 
requirements, larger loan amounts, or longer maturities.  
Conversely, when the market’s risk assessment of a bank is more favorable (lower risk) 
than that of the regulators, investors are confronted with a positive information shock, which 
reduces, if not eradicates, the cost of asymmetric information. As a result, the bank is no longer 
subject to intense scrutiny by the market, nor is it obliged to take supplementary actions to 
convince regulators of its reduced solvency risk; in fact, it may even exploit this situation by 
increasing its loan spreads.  
If these factors constitute an underlying channel through which portfolio risk 
differences affect loan terms, we expect to observe a reduction in loan spreads among banks 
with positive portfolio risk differences (i.e., when the bank’s portfolio risk is considered higher 
by the markets than by regulators). This in turn forms our first hypothesis: 
 
H1: An increase in portfolio risk differences for banks deemed riskier by markets than 
by regulators decreases the cost of bank loans extended to corporate borrowers.  
 
We further expect the downward adjustment of loan spreads following an increase in 
bank portfolio risk differences to be contingent on the characteristics of the lending bank. In 
this respect, the adjustment should be less sizeable ‒ or even reversed ‒ for large, profitable 
lenders with limited exposure to non-performing loans. Large institutions have distinct 
structural characteristics and corporate governance schemes compared to small institutions, 
which leads them to process the same economic news and developments differently (Chan and 
Chen, 1991). In addition, large, sophisticated lenders might have more efficient credit risk 
departments for monitoring overall credit risk exposure and counterparty risk, rendering these 
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banks less susceptible than smaller, less sophisticated lenders to adverse information stemming 
from market-based estimates. 
The existence of a prior lending relationship between the lead bank and the borrowing 
firm further emerges as an additional mechanism for minimizing uncertainty regarding a bank’s 
ability to serve a loan. Typically, these relationships can convey information to banks that firms 
cannot credibly communicate to the capital markets; however, they also work in the opposite 
direction, as firms can obtain valuable information from banks in excess of that available to the 
markets (Kang and Stulz, 2000; Bharath, Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2009). Either party 
can capitalize on this relationship in bad times, with banks in particular being able to increase 
their bargaining power during the loan negotiation process, limiting the effects of increased 
portfolio risk differences (Bolton, Freixas, Gambacorta, and Mistrulli, 2016). 
In the presence of the above mechanisms, we expect to observe a reversal in the sign 
on portfolio risk differences for loans granted by well-managed lenders with a prior relationship 
with the borrower compared to poorly managed first-time lenders. This leads to our second 
hypothesis: 
 
H2: The adverse effects of portfolio risk differences on loan spreads are contained for 
well-performing lenders with a previous borrower relationship than poorly performing first-
time lenders. 
 
Another mechanism potentially affecting loan spreads operates through the syndicate 
structure. Although participant banks can place their own non-restrictive bids for buying shares 
of a loan, they depend primarily on the negotiation and facilitation of the loan conducted by 
their syndicate’s lead bank. This can result in adverse selection concerns, however, as the lead 
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bank has an incentive to syndicate discounted loans in order to entice borrowing firms and 
facilitate its own loan portfolio growth.  
Furthermore, when the lead bank retains a very large share of the loan, the borrowing 
firm is largely exposed to the bank’s idiosyncratic credit risk. In the case of positive portfolio 
risk differences (i.e., excess market risk over regulation risk), this risk is higher than the initial 
regulatory estimate, and so the spreading of the loan across a wider syndicate signals a higher-
quality loan. This in turn reduces asymmetric information between the lead bank and the 
borrowing firm, minimizing or removing the discount offered to the borrowing firm.  
From a different perspective, the allocation of the lead bank’s share of a loan over its 
(dispersed) syndicate also decreases the bank’s credit-risk exposure. Considering the 
importance of credit-risk diversification for the lead bank’s loan sales (see Pavel and Phillis, 
1987; Pennacchi, 1988; Gorton and Pennacchi, 1995; Demsetz, 2000), the bank will therefore 
be able to increase the loan rate offered to the borrower. These two co-directional effects 
stemming from the reduction of asymmetric information and increase in diversification will 
increase the bank’s loan spread. 
If the lead bank’s share and the degree of syndicate concentration are indeed effective 
mechanisms for reducing the cost of information asymmetry in terms of the higher-than-
expected level of a bank’s solvency risk, we expect a negative relation between loan 
characteristics and the offered loan rate. Similarly, the lower the lead bank’s share, the more 
aligned the incentives between the lead bank and its syndicate participants and the higher the 
loan spread. This gives rise to our third hypothesis: 
 
H3: The adverse effect of portfolio risk differences on loan spreads is contained for 
wider, less concentrated syndicates relative to smaller, more concentrated syndicates. 
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3. Data and Empirical Methodology 
We use syndicated loans from DealScan, which provides information on the loan pricing of 
banks with actively traded stocks and, by extension, measurable market-based portfolio risk. 
We consider only loans with information on loan spreads, which eliminates all types of Islamic 
finance and very specialized credit lines. Our dataset covers the 2002–2016 period and the 
number of loan facilities in our baseline specifications ranges from 42,982 to 52,038 in total, 
depending on the control variables used. The loans are drawn from 364 lead banks 
headquartered in 41 countries and offered to 10,255 borrowers operating in 102 countries. 
We match the loans with bank- and firm-specific information, although in most of our 
analyses, we use firm × year fixed effects that render firm-year characteristics redundant. In a 
third round of data collection, we match the resulting dataset with macroeconomic and 
institutional (country-year) variables from several freely available sources. Again, the 
specifications using lender country × year fixed effects and borrower country × year fixed 
effects render the effects of country-year characteristics redundant. We provide variable 
definitions and sources in Table 1 and basic summary statistics in Table 2.  
Further, in Table A1 we report the number of loans and the mean and standard deviation 
of Portfolio risk differences by lender country. In loans granted by U.S. lenders, which 
represent about half of our sample, Portfolio risk differences range from -0.31 to 0.09. The 
phenomenon is even more pronounced in the Eurozone countries, where Portfolio risk 
differences are persistently negative, pointing to more conservative regulator estimates. 
[Insert Tables 1 & 2 here] 
 
3.1. Empirical Model and Key Variables 
The baseline form of our empirical model is: 
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The outcome variable Cost of credit is the all-in spread drawn (AISD) of loan facility l 
originated at time t. AISD equals the spread of the loan facility over LIBOR plus any facility 
fees. The main coefficient of interest in Equation (1) is , which indicates the effect of 
portfolio risk differences on the cost of credit. In line with Hypothesis 1, we expect  to be 
negative if the differences between the market and regulator estimations of risk increase market 
discipline, imposing a competition effect and thus lowering the cost of credit offered by banks 
to borrowing firms. 
Portfolio risk differences for each lender  at time  are the (standardized) residuals 	 
of the OLS regression of a lender’s asset volatility (Bank asset volatility) on the lender’s ratio 
of capital to risk-weighted assets (RBC ratio), or: 
 
  	 !" =  + #   + 	 .                                                              2 
 
The residuals from Equation (2) capture the components of the market perception of lender risk 
not embedded in the regulatory measure of lender risk, with results reported in Table A3. A 
positive (negative) residual means that the assessment of a bank’s portfolio risk according to 
the market is higher (lower) than the assessment made by regulatory authorities. This is our 
measure for asymmetric information between markets and regulators regarding bank portfolio 
risk. 
The suitability of asset volatility as a measure for bank portfolio risk stems from its 
ability to reflect asset value changes, liability value changes, and other developments in off-
balance items and operating efficiency. To derive a bank’s asset volatility, we follow prior 
literature (e.g., Ronn and Verma, 1986; Flannery and Sorescu, 1996; Flannery and Rangan, 
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2008; Vallascas and Hagendorff, 2013) and use the Black-Scholes-Merton option pricing 
model. Specifically, bank equity (%&) at time ' is modeled as a call option on bank assets with 
strike price equal to the promised debt payment (i.e., the bank’s total liabilities ()): 
 
%& = max-%& − (& , 01.                                                                                                                          3 
 
 Therefore, the market value of bank equity %3, at time  (with  < ') is expressed as 
a function of the (unobservable) market value of bank assets %5,, satisfying: 
 
%3, = %5,67
,8 − (	9:;&67
,8,                                                                                               4 
 
with             
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A B + CDE +
1
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and       
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 = 
,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Based on Merton (1974), the value of bank equity is a function of the value of bank 
assets and time so that the volatility of bank equity (F3,) is related to the volatility of bank 
assets (FG,): 
 
F3, = %5,%3, 67
,8FG,.                                                                                                                          7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 In Equation (4), the term 6
, can be interpreted as the factor by which the present 
value of the contingent receipt of bank assets (discounted at risk-free rate ') exceeds the 
current value of bank assets, while 6
, reflects the probability of the (bank closure) option 
being exercised.  
By simultaneously solving Equations (4) and (7) and setting ' = 1, we extract FG, for 
each bank annually. Similarly to Vallascas and Hagendorff (2013), we employ, as starting 
values for FG,, the historical annualized yearly standard deviation of bank equity returns 
multiplied by the ratio of the market value of bank equity to the sum of the market value of 
bank equity and the book value of bank total liabilities; that is: 
 
F5, = F3,%3, 7%3, + (8⁄ .                                                                                                                 8 
 
 Through an iterative process, we use a Newton search algorithm to calculate the 
(implied) yearly values for bank asset volatility (FG,) and bank asset value (%5,). The resulting 
measure (FG,) is our preferred market-based measure for bank risk and we use it as the 
dependent variable in Equation (2). For our sample of banks, the mean (median) bank asset 
volatility, expressed in percentages, is 2.42 (1.89).  
 
3.2. Identification, Controls, and Fixed Effects 
Identifying the causal effect of Portfolio risk differences on the Cost of credit is the key aim of 
our empirical analysis. Simultaneity and reverse causality are not the main identification 
problems because bank capital and risk are predetermined when new loan decisions are made; 
our main problem is omitted-variable bias, especially in distinguishing between loan supply 
and loan demand. 
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Consistent with related studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009; Delis, Hasan, and 
Ongena, 2019), we control for the log of the loan amount, loan maturity (in months), the 
number of participant banks in a syndicate, dummies for performance-pricing provisions and 
collateral, and the total number of covenants.1 We also conduct sensitivity tests without loan 
control variables to confirm that our model is not subject to a “bad controls” problem. We 
further control for bank characteristics, such as bank size, return on assets, and non-performing 
loans; likewise, our set of firm-level controls include firm size, firm return on assets, and firm 
Tobin’s Q. We provide exact definitions of these variables in Table 1 and summary statistics 
in Table 2.  
To maintain a high level of variation in Portfolio risk differences, we initially consider 
a specification with a very simple set of fixed effects – namely, year-, bank-, and firm-level 
effects – allowing us to estimate the coefficient on our portfolio risk differences measure for 
the largest possible number of banks and firms in our sample. However, since our basic 
hypothesis is that the interest rate response to changes in our risk differences measure is supply-
driven, we adopt more restrictive fixed effects in subsequent specifications.  
Importantly, we use firm × year fixed effects to control for time-varying firm-side 
(demand-side) explanations for our findings, such as firm-year changes in risk, changes in loan 
demand, borrowers’ corporate governance, etc. This means that to estimate Equation (1) we 
obtain identification from firms with at least two loan facilities extended within the same year. 
Moreover, the inclusion of lender country × year fixed effects shields our specification from 
country-year (macroeconomic) developments in the lender’s country. The regression still 
yields results on the main coefficient of interest because there are multiple loan facilities from 
the same country within a year, with the inclusion of borrower country × year fixed effects as 
                                               
1
 Including either the total number of covenants or the number of general and financial covenants leaves our results 
unaffected. 
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an additional sensitivity test serving the same purpose for the borrower’s country. Our last set 
of fixed effects includes those at the quarter level, which eliminates any undesired variation 
beyond the quarterly frequency not absorbed by our remaining fixed effects.  
 
4. The Effect of Portfolio Risk Differences on the Cost of Credit 
4.1. Baseline Results 
Table 3 reports the results of the estimation of Equation (1) using OLS and various fixed 
effects, including the coefficient estimates and t-statistics obtained from standard errors 
clustered by lender country and bank. In column (1), we include year, bank, and firm fixed 
effects, and in column (2), we introduce lender country × year fixed effects that control for 
time-varying macroeconomic conditions in the bank’s country, while column (3) introduces 
loan-type fixed effects.2 Across these specifications, the coefficients on Portfolio risk 
differences are negative and statistically significant at conventional levels.  
In column (4), we add firm × year fixed effects, controlling for loan-demand forces for 
each firm-year, and consequently notice that the coefficient on our variable of interest doubles 
in magnitude while retaining its negative, statistically significant sign. This effect is further 
confirmed in column (5), where we add borrower country fixed effects along with loan purpose 
fixed effects. Specification (6) is the most demanding as it also includes borrower country × 
year fixed effects, controlling for the macroeconomic environment in the borrowing firm’s 
country, and quarter fixed effects, which control for any remaining variations at the quarterly 
level. Across all specifications, the general finding is that larger Portfolio risk differences exert 
a negative, statistically significant effect on loan spreads.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
                                               
2
 In the last row of each table, we report the number of banks and firms from which we obtain identification in the 
corresponding estimations. 
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 We choose specification (4) as our baseline since it controls to a reasonable extent for 
time-varying loan-demand forces and macroeconomic fundamentals without being 
overburdened by fixed effects, thereby allowing for sufficient variation in our variable of 
interest. The main coefficient of interest, , reveals that a one standard deviation increase in 
Portfolio risk differences decreases AISD by an average of 11.2 basis points (=56.0 basis points 
× 0.20). Economically, this is a sizeable effect, equal to a 4.1% (=11.2 basis points ÷ 272.0 
basis points) decrease for the average loan amount in our sample. Given that the average loan 
size is USD 352 million, banks with increased asset volatility relative to the regulatory 
estimation of their portfolio risk lose approximately USD 0.39 million (=USD 352 million × 
11.2 basis points) per year in foregone interest. For an average loan maturity of 5.0 years, this 
represents approximately USD 1.95 million in interest losses over the loan’s duration.3 
However, this forms only part of the picture: each lead bank in our sample grants on 
average 26.1 loans per year, while the average bank share for the available observations is 
28.7%. Assuming that the loan share figure is representative of the average lender in our 
sample, the overall annual cost arising from the lender’s total loan operations within a given 
year increases to USD 2.95 million (=USD 0.39 million × 26.1 loans × 28.7% share).4 
We next include Negative risk differences and Positive risk differences, i.e., values of 
Portfolio risk differences below and above zero, in our baseline specification. This enables us 
to identify any related asymmetric effects exerted by our risk differences measure on loan 
spreads. We report the results in Table 4. Column (1) reveals that the negative values for risk 
differences fail to exert a material effect on loan spreads. In column (2), however, a one 
standard deviation increase in Positive risk differences lowers spreads by almost 12 basis 
                                               
3
 Assuming five annual payments and LIBOR as the discount rate, the increase in interest expense equals USD 
1.86 million for the average 12-month LIBOR rate of 2.1% during our sample period (for similar calculations, see 
Ivashina and Sun, 2011). 
4
 Bank share is only reported for 6,276 of the 42,982 loan facilities in our sample. Generalizing this average to 
apply to all loan facilities is a plausible assumption, since it is not very different from the average loan share 
values reported in previous studies (e.g., Sufi, 2007; Ivashina, 2009). 
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points. The dominance of Positive risk differences over Negative risk differences is further 
confirmed in column (3), which features both of the aforementioned measures in the absence 
of our overall risk differences measure. In this case, the effect of risk differences on AISD 
results solely from positive values on our risk differences measure. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Further, column (4) presents the interaction between Portfolio risk differences and an 
indicator for the group of banks with Portfolio risk differences above our sample mean. Since 
the average Portfolio risk difference in our sample is -0.18, a one standard deviation increase 
in this measure (raising the mean value to 0.20) will automatically move the average bank into 
the positive risk differences group, wherein its market risk is deemed higher than its regulatory 
risk (or increase the risk differences value of banks with already positive Portfolio risk 
differences yet further). In this case, Portfolio risk differences has a positive, statistically 
significant coefficient, with the significance of our risk differences measures being picked up 
by our interaction term (the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences × Positive risk differences 
group).  
These results reveal that the (negative) effect of portfolio risk differences on loan 
spreads is not symmetric across all banks, but is instead focused in banks considered higher 
risk by markets than by regulators. Banks with negative risk differences are affected the least, 
if at all, suggesting that a higher regulatory assessment acts as a safeguard against lending cost. 
In Table 5, we examine whether the disciplining effect exerted by Portfolio risk 
differences is market- or regulatory-driven. We re-estimate Table 3’s specification (2) by 
sequentially including different combinations of our risk differences measure with its 
constituents (each of the regulatory- and market-based measures). In columns (1) and (2), 
Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank asset volatility and RBC ratio, respectively. 
The coefficient on Portfolio risk differences is negative and statistically significant in both 
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specifications, ranging between 5.5 and 12.8 basis points in response to a one standard 
deviation increase. The effect of Bank asset volatility is picked up by Portfolio risk differences 
in column (1), while the regulatory measure appears significant for syndicated loan spreads in 
column (2), with a one standard deviation increase in RBC ratio raising AISD by 4.8 basis 
points. However, the effect of the regulatory estimate is independent of the effect exerted by 
the risk differences measure, with RBC ratio failing to absorb the size and significance of the 
coefficient on Portfolio risk differences. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
Presenting the individual components of our Portfolio risk differences in column (3), 
we observe the dominance of market-based risk estimates over regulatory estimates: market 
risk estimates come with a negative and statistically significant value, while regulatory 
estimates do not affect loan spreads. Most importantly, a one standard deviation increase in 
Bank asset volatility lowers AISD by 11.7 basis points, which corresponds to the effect of 
Portfolio risk differences in our baseline specification in Table 3, column (4). When including 
all of our measures concurrently in column (4), Bank asset volatility and RBC ratio no longer 
have statistically significant coefficients, while our risk differences measure retains its 
negative, statistically significant sign. It appears that although market-based estimates have a 
relatively greater impact than their regulatory counterparts, it is the difference between the two 
(and the relevant information asymmetry) that exerts a disciplining (negative) effect on bank 
loan spreads. 
Based on our estimates in Tables 3–5, and consistent with Hypothesis 1, we can infer 
that wider differences between regulatory and market-based measures of bank portfolio risk 
substantially decrease the cost of loans offered by banks, ceteris paribus. We illustrate the 
implications of this estimate by considering the example of a prominent U.S. bank, Bank of 
America Merrill Lynch. During our sample period, the average Portfolio risk differences value 
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for Bank of America is -0.12, meaning the market-based assessment of its portfolio risk is 
lower than the regulatory assessment. Furthermore, the average AISD on the loan facilities 
granted by Bank of America when its Portfolio risk differences is above its mean value is 
280.19 basis points, approximately 19% higher than the below-mean value of 235.02 basis 
points. Looking at specific sub-periods, from 2013 to 2016, Bank of America’s average 
Portfolio risk differences is -0.31, the average AISD on its loans is 267.23 basis points, and the 
average amount of each loan is USD 392 million. However, during the 2002–2005 period, the 
mean value for Bank of America’s Portfolio risk differences is 0.09, the average AISD is 231.51 
basis points, and the average loan amount is less than half of its amount nearly a decade later: 
USD 176 million. Similar examples exist for other leading banks predominantly based in 
countries with developed economies. 
In Table A3 of the Appendix, we examine the sensitivity of our estimates to the “bad 
controls” problem by interchangeably excluding loan-level control variables from our 
specifications.5,6 Irrespective of the specifications used, the coefficient on Portfolio risk 
differences retains its negative, statistically significant value, ranging between 9.3 and 10.7 
basis points per one standard deviation increase. 
The size and magnitude of the coefficients on the control variables in Tables 3–5 are 
generally in line with the recent works of Bae and Goyal (2009), Ivashina (2009), Cai, Eidam, 
Saunders, and Steffen (2018), and Delis, Hasan, and Ongena (2019). In particular, loan spreads 
decrease in loan amount and increase in maturity as well as being more competitively priced 
when collateral and more performance provisions are included in the spread or more members 
enter the syndicate. The behavior of bank-level variables is also largely anticipated, with 
                                               
5
 Since the “bad controls” problem is due to differences in the composition of loans to a given firm, in an 
alternative sensitivity test, we include weights based on the number and amount of loans received by each firm 
(results available upon request). 
6
 The replacement (or addition) of Number of covenants with Financial covenants or Net covenants leaves our 
results unchanged. 
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greater bank size and return on assets associated with decreasing AISD while increased non-
performing loans are associated with higher loan spreads. 
 
4.2. Additional Sensitivity Tests 
In Table A4, we test our results’ sensitivity to the type of standard error clustering. Column (1) 
features clustering by lender country and year, column (2) by bank and year, and column (3) 
by bank and firm. In the subsequent specifications, we adopt even more demanding clustering, 
such as lender’s country and bank and year in column (4), bank and firm and year in column 
(5), and lender’s country and borrower’s country and year in column (6). Across all 
specifications, the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences is similar to that of our baseline 
specification.  
We next re-estimate our baseline specification by employing different versions of our 
original portfolio risk differences measure and report the results in Table A5. Specifically, we 
use a common risk-free rate for all European monetary union countries in Equation (4), and 
estimate Equation (2) without a constant, without standardized residuals, and for each bank 
separately.  
So far, we have assumed that all loans enter the model weighted equally. While the 
fixed effects in Table 3 provide a safeguard against cross-country variation, we nevertheless 
acknowledge that our empirical specification might be open to criticism that borrower countries 
receiving more or fewer loans could disproportionately affect our results. To this end, in Table 
A6 we use weighted least squares and several different weights based on the country–year 
number of loans, retaining the same set of fixed effects. Our results are very similar to the 
baseline. 
Further, considering a positive relation between expansionary monetary policy and 
bank risk-taking, we test whether our estimates might be contaminated by the actions of policy 
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makers.7 As such, we interact Portfolio risk differences with a set of proxies for monetary 
policy conditions to see whether the effect of risk differences varies in different monetary 
policy regimes.8 Regardless of the frequency used in our monetary policy measure, the results 
in Table A8 show that the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences is negative and statistically 
significant at 1%. Moreover, the coefficients on each of the interaction terms are positive and 
significant, indicating that a sizeable portion of the impact of Portfolio risk differences (i.e., 
between 30.2% and 30.9%) is reversed during periods of monetary contraction. The coefficient 
on our monetary policy measure (Discount rate), on the other hand, is negative and statistically 
significant, thereby confirming the operative risk-taking channel of monetary policy. Similar 
evidence is provided for the U.S. by Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis (2017) and Paligorova and 
Santos (2017). Most importantly, the effect of risk differences net of monetary conditions (as 
reflected in the difference between the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences and each of the 
coefficients on the interaction terms) is within the range suggested by our baseline regressions.9 
 
4.3. Accounting for Sample Selection Bias 
In this section, we consider whether our results are affected by selection bias if the effect of 
Portfolio risk differences on AISD is due to firms borrowing from relatively riskier banks in 
order to obtain more favorable loan terms. To exclude this possibility, we follow Dass and 
Massa (2011) in employing Heckman’s (1979) two-stage model. In the first stage, we estimate 
a probit model of the probability of a firm borrowing from the given bank. We then calculate 
Heckman’s lambda (inverse Mills ratio) and include it as an additional control variable in the 
                                               
7
 According to the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, low interest rates entice banks to assume positions of 
greater risk (see, among others, Jiménez, Ongena, Peydró, and Saurina, 2012, 2014; Altunbas, Gambacorta, and 
Marquéz-Ibáñez, 2014; Delis, Hasan, and Mylonidis, 2017). 
8
 Consistent with the risk-taking channel literature, these proxies are lagged by one period (i.e., by one month and 
one year in specifications (1) and (2) respectively). 
9
 These results further hold in regressions where standard errors are clustered by lender’s country and year 
(available upon request). 
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second-stage OLS estimation of Equation (1). We include all syndicated loan facilities in 
DealScan, providing enough information for the first-stage probit to estimate the determinants 
of a firm’s decision to borrow from a given lead bank. Similar to Dass and Massa (2011), we 
assume that a firm’s decision to obtain a syndicated loan is a function of the main determinants 
of its decision to borrow in general. These determinants consist of a set of bank and firm 
characteristics, and loan type, year, firm, and borrower’s country dummies. 
We report the results in Table A7. According to the probit estimates in columns (1) and 
(2) of Panel A, the higher the size, Tobin’s Q, and leverage of a firm, the more likely it is to 
complete a syndicated loan deal. Unsurprisingly, firms opt for syndicate financing when 
seeking loans with longer maturity; however, these loans require increasing amounts of 
collateral and performance-pricing provisions. Most importantly, the estimates from the 
second-stage regressions in columns (1) and (2) of Panel B confirm the strong negative effect 
of Portfolio risk differences on AISD. In fact, this effect is significantly larger than in our 
baseline estimations, amounting to 12.8–12.9 basis points per one standard deviation increase 
in our risk differences measure. 
 
4.4. The Discrepancy between Bank Asset Volatility and Bank Leverage  
A distinctive feature of the global financial crisis in 2008 was the build-up of excessive on- 
and off-balance sheet leverage in the banking system. During the crisis period, we witnessed 
the paradox of banks building up excessive leverage, despite simultaneously maintaining 
relatively strong risk-based capital requirements. This caused a deleveraging process that in 
turn led to significant bank write-offs and a reduction of available credit in the real economy. 
The regulatory response by the Basel Committee was to introduce a leverage ratio with the aim 
of assisting the risk-based capital ratio and containing the negative consequences of bank 
deleveraging. In this subsection, we consider the discrepancy between bank asset volatility and 
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bank leverage. We create the new risk differences measure by re-estimating Equation (2) and 
replacing the RBC ratio with the bank leverage ratio. We then examine the impact of this 
measure on the cost of credit according to Equation (1) and present the results in Table 6. 
Across specifications (1)–(3), the new risk differences measure has a sizeable, 
statistically significant impact on loan spreads. This is the case when the measure is considered 
individually in column (1) as well as along with each of its two components in columns (2) and 
(3). However, when we estimate these components together in the absence of our leverage-
based risk differences measure, as seen in column (4), they have a non-statistically significant 
coefficient. When all measures are simultaneously included in our model, only Portfolio risk 
differences (leverage) has a statistically significant effect of 6.4 basis points on AISD. This 
highlights the significance of our leverage-based portfolio risk differences measure on the 
determination of loan spreads, though the results pale in comparison to those estimated by our 
market-based measure. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
5. The Role of Bank Characteristics and Lending Relationships  
The previous section documents how syndicate structure and the inclusion of additional lending 
parties (each with a non-trivial stake in the loan) minimizes the cost of information asymmetry 
in terms of a lead bank’s solvency risk. In this section, we first build on our findings that the 
effect of portfolio risk differences is supply-driven and examine whether the effect of portfolio 
risk differences varies across different bank types and bank financial health. We present the 
results in Table 7, with each column including the interaction of Portfolio risk differences with 
a different bank-level characteristic. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
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 Our first assumption is that large banks are less sensitive to economic news compared 
to smaller banks. This may be a consequence of large banks’ organizational structures, market 
power, corporate governance schemes, and level of operations and credit risk diversification. 
However, in column (1) we observe that the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences × Bank 
size, albeit positive, is not statistically significant at conventional levels, rejecting that bank 
size offsets the impact of risk differences on loan spreads.  
We then consider banks’ financial health (variables that proxy for bank performance 
and credit risk), expecting that more profitable, better-managed banks might have less need to 
establish their creditworthiness. According to the estimates in column (2), the effect of 
Portfolio risk differences inversely relates to a bank’s return on assets, suggesting that stronger 
bank performance acts as a counterforce to decreasing loan spreads. Specifically, banks 
achieving an additional 2% return on their assets are able to contain their interest loss by almost 
11.7% (the coefficient on the interaction term). This is expected, because stronger performance 
favorably affects private agent expectations. Moreover, column (3) shows that banks 
completely offset the discount in their offered loan rates by limiting the proportion of non-
performing loans in their portfolio. Specifically, a decrease of one standard deviation in Bank 
NPLs brings an increase in AISD of more than 2.2 basis points, reversing approximately 25.9% 
of the initial interest rate discount (coefficient on Portfolio risk differences × Bank NPLs). 
 In columns (4) and (5), we consider the role of bank credit ratings, which are frequently 
employed by market participants and regulatory authorities as general measures of 
creditworthiness, although these ratings are more static and less responsive to various 
systematic and idiosyncratic events than our principal risk differences measure. An upgrade in 
a bank’s credit rating has a positive effect on loan spreads, with the coefficient on the 
interaction between Portfolio risk differences and Bank credit rating in column (4) as well as 
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Portfolio risk differences and Bank credit rating category in column (5) being positive and 
statistically significant. 
Another important source of heterogeneity in the effect of Portfolio risk differences on 
bank lending is relationship lending. In relationship lending, the bank acquires valuable 
information on the borrower’s operations and credit risk. Due to the resulting reduction of 
information asymmetry, it is possible that banks do not provide the same discounts on loans 
offered to repeat borrowers compared to those to new borrowers. In Table 8, we use measures 
that reflect the existence and intensity of a prior bank–firm lending relationship (e.g., Bharath, 
Dahiya, Saunders, and Srinivasan, 2009). Our basic measure is the number of loans between a 
given bank–firm pair as part of the total number of loans extended by the bank within a five-
year period. We observe that the lead bank is able to recover an approximately 6.4 basis points 
or 50.3% of initial interest loss due to Portfolio risk differences (the coefficient on the 
interaction term). We confirm this effect for alternative measures, with columns (2) and (3) 
showing that this effect further depends on the intensity and magnitude of the lending 
relationship.  
 [Insert Table 8 about here] 
Overall, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the analysis in this section shows that the effect 
of portfolio risk differences is contingent on a lending bank’s performance and management 
practices as well as prior transactions with a borrowing firm.  
 
6. The Role of Syndicate Structure 
A potential channel through which the disciplining effect of increased portfolio risk differences 
could manifest is syndicate structure, which operates via other lenders that join the lead bank 
in forming a syndicate. If borrowing firms are unfamiliar with the lead bank, this gives rise to 
an adverse selection problem wherein the lead bank must convince the borrower of its solid 
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credit reputation. By forming a more dispersed syndicate and retaining a smaller share of the 
loan, the lead bank can minimize this problem of information asymmetry. This can alleviate 
the need for potential borrowers to spend more time investigating the lead bank in order to 
acquire more “informed” capital regarding the bank’s financial health (Sufi, 2007).  
Being part of a more dispersed syndicate can also serve a certification effect, easing 
potential adverse selection and subsequent moral hazard concerns regarding the lead bank’s 
solvency risk (Ivashina, 2009; Sufi, 2007). This can be accomplished by including additional 
lead and/or participant banks in the syndicate. Existing studies show that syndicate structure 
varies in regards to borrower attributes related to credit risk and transparency (e.g., Dennis and 
Mullineaux, 2000; Lee and Mullineaux, 2004; Jones, Lang, and Nigro, 2005; Ivashina, 2009; 
Sufi, 2007). In our setting, the addition of more syndicate members and greater spreading of 
loan shares across the syndicate is expected to ease lead bank solvency risk concerns, allowing 
the bank to reverse the discount on its offered loan rates. This will in turn be reflected in the 
higher spreads for loans granted by more diverse, less concentrated syndicates. 
 Below, we examine how syndicate structure helps alleviate the effect of risk differences 
by interacting Portfolio risk differences with a number of loan characteristics reflecting the size 
and structure of a syndicate. The results are presented in Table 9, with estimates from column 
(1) suggesting that an increase in a syndicate’s number of lenders provides a positive signal for 
a lead bank’s creditworthiness. Specifically, including eight additional lenders in the syndicate 
(i.e., increasing Number of lenders by approximately one standard deviation) saves the lead 
bank almost 5.2 basis points. Column (2) shows that this effect is mainly driven by the addition 
of lead banks (the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences × Number of leads), with the addition 
of four lead banks in a syndicate resulting in loan spread savings of 3.6 basis points. 
[Insert Table 9 about here] 
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 Columns (3) and (4) feature the interaction of our risk differences measure with lead 
bank loan share and degree of syndicate concentration, respectively.10 Both specifications 
confirm the beneficial effect of spreading the loan share across the (many) members of a 
syndicate. According to column (3), decreasing Bank share by one standard deviation (or 
24.5%) results in a higher AISD by approximately 11.6 basis points (the coefficient on the 
interaction term). This is further reflected in syndicate structure, with a decrease in a 
syndicate’s Herfindahl index (i.e., the formation of a less concentrated syndicate) resulting in 
an additional increase of similar magnitude in an offered loan spread (coefficient on Portfolio 
risk differences × Syndicate Herfindahl). 
 Across all specifications, the coefficient on Portfolio risk differences remains negative 
and statistically significant, confirming the disciplining effect of portfolio risk differences on 
syndicated loan spreads. However, consistent with Hypothesis 3, this effect can be largely 
mitigated when limiting the lead bank’s stake in a loan and forming a less concentrated 
syndicate. 
 
7. Conclusions 
In this paper, we note considerable differences between perceptions of regulators and financial 
markets in the degree of risk attached to a bank’s portfolio. We maintain that this difference 
reveals information asymmetry between regulators and markets about bank portfolio risk. We 
examine the effect of such information asymmetry on the loan pricing decisions of banks, using 
data from the syndicated loans market. 
 Our baseline specification shows that a one standard deviation increase in our measure 
of portfolio risk differences reduces loan spreads by more than 11 basis points (equivalent to a 
4.1% increase), rendering banks subject to a loss of about USD 1.95 million in interest income 
                                               
10
 Both measures are mean-centered before entering the regressions. 
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over the duration of the average loan. Considering that the average lead bank extends 
approximately 26 loan facilities per year, in which it retains an average 29% stake, the annual 
cost increases to USD 2.95 million. These results persist in an array of sensitivity exercises and 
alternative estimation methods, and are most significant when portfolio risk differences are 
positive (i.e., market estimations of bank risk are higher than regulator estimations). 
Importantly, the separate effects of market and regulatory risk (i.e., not their difference) are 
much less potent.  
We further show that the effect of portfolio risk differences is heterogeneous to banks’ 
financial health. For banks with higher profitability ratios, better credit ratings, and lower levels 
of non-performing loans, the negative effect of portfolio risk differences is much less potent, 
if at all present. Even for banks exposed to the negative effect, there are two strategies to 
mitigate it. First, banks can form strong bank–firm relationships, thereby reducing the adverse 
effects of information asymmetries between markets and regulators on their loan spreads. 
Second, the reduction of a lead bank’s loan share via the formation of a wider, less concentrated 
syndicate can have a certification effect, easing potential adverse selection and subsequent 
moral hazard concerns regarding the lead bank’s solvency risk. 
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Table 1. Variable definitions and sources 
Variable  Description Source 
   
A. Dependent variables in main specifications 
AISD All-in-spread-drawn, defined as the sum of the spread over LIBOR plus any facility 
fee. 
DealScan 
 
B. Main explanatory variables: Difference between market-based and regulatory measure of bank risk 
Portfolio risk differences The residuals from the regression of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio. Own estimations 
Negative risk differences The negative values of Portfolio risk differences. Own estimations 
Positive risk differences The positive values of Portfolio risk differences. Own estimations 
Portfolio risk differences 
(leverage) 
The residuals from the regression of Bank asset volatility on bank leverage, i.e., the 
sum of the bank long-term debt, short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt 
divided by the bank common equity. The estimation method is the same as that for the 
calculation of Portfolio risk differences. 
Own estimations 
   
C. Explanatory variables: Loan characteristics 
Loan amount Log of the loan facility amount in USD. DealScan 
Maturity  Loan duration in months. DealScan 
Collateral Dummy equal to one if the loan is secured with collateral, zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of lenders The number of banks involved in the syndicated loan (lead and participant banks). DealScan 
Performance provisions Dummy equal to one if the loan has performance pricing provisions, zero otherwise. DealScan 
Number of covenants The total number of covenants in the loan contract. DealScan 
Number of participants The number of participant banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Number of leads The number of lead banks involved in the syndicated loan. DealScan 
Bank share The bank’s share in the loan facility (%). DealScan 
Syndicate Herfindahl The syndicate’s Herfindahl index, calculated as the sum of the squared individual 
shares in the loan. It ranges from 0 to 10,000, with 10,000 being the Herfindahl when 
a lender holds 100% of the loan. 
DealScan 
Loan type A series of dummy variables indicating loan type (e.g., term loans, revolvers, etc.). DealScan 
Loan purpose A series of dummy variables indicating loan purpose (e.g., corporate purpose, debt 
repay, etc.). 
DealScan 
Relationship lending A binary variable equal to one for a prior loan facility between the lender and the 
borrower in the 5-year period before the loan facility’s origination year, zero 
otherwise. 
DealScan 
 
Relationship lending 
number 
The ratio of the number of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower in 
the 5-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total number of 
loans received by the borrower during the same period. 
DealScan 
 
Relationship lending 
amount 
The ratio of the amount of prior loan facilities between the lender and the borrower in 
the 5-year period before the loan facility’s origination year to the total amount of 
loans received by the borrower during the same period.  
DealScan 
 
   
D. Explanatory variables: Lender characteristics 
Bank asset volatility The volatility of bank assets estimated via option pricing theory. Datastream 
own estimations 
RBC ratio The ratio of capital to risk-weighted assets. Compustat 
Bank size The log of total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank ROA The return on total bank assets. Compustat 
Bank NPLs The ratio of non-performing loans to total loans. Compustat 
Bank credit rating A categorical variable (from -1 to +1) reflecting the change in the bank’s credit 
rating. A value of -1 reflects a downgrade in the bank’s credit rating, a value of 0 
reflects an upgrade in the bank’s credit rating, and a value of +1 reflects no change in 
the bank’s credit rating. 
S&P Capital IQ 
Bank credit rating 
category  
A categorical variable (from -1 to +1) reflecting the change in the bank’s credit rating 
category. A value of -1 reflects a downgrade in the bank’s credit rating category, a 
value of +1 reflects an upgrade in the bank’s credit rating category, and a value of 0 
reflects no change in the bank’s credit rating category. 
S&P Capital IQ 
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E. Explanatory variables: Borrower characteristics 
Firm size The log of total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm ROA The return on total firm assets. Compustat 
Firm Tobin’s Q The firm’s Tobin’s Q. Compustat 
Firm leverage The firm’s leverage. Compustat 
   
F. Explanatory variables: Lender’s country characteristics 
GDP growth The difference in annual GDP growth rate (%) between the lender’s and the 
borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
 
GDP per capita The difference in annual GDP per capita in constant prices between the lender’s and 
the borrower’s countries. 
WDI 
 
Stock market 
capitalization 
The difference in stock market capitalization between the lender’s and the borrower’s 
countries. Stock market capitalization is measured as the total value (in USD) of all 
listed shares in the borrower’s country stock market as a percentage of GDP. 
WDI 
Interbank rate The difference in the interbank rate between the lender’s and the borrower’s 
countries. 
WDI 
Discount rate The discount rate set by the central bank in the lender’s country. IMF 
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Table 2. Summary statistics 
Variable definitions are in Table 1. 
 
Obs. Mean Std. dev. Min. Max. 
AISD 42,982 271.96 176.89 1.00 1,750.00 
Portfolio risk differences 42,982 -0.18 0.20 -1.82 2.12 
Negative risk differences 42,982 -0.21 0.14 -1.82 0.00 
Positive risk differences 42,982 0.03 0.10 0.00 2.12 
Portfolio risk differences (leverage) 42,807 -0.19 0.11 -1.63 1.18 
Loan amount 42,982 18.50 1.58 10.88 24.62 
Maturity 42,982 59.50 34.22 0.00 540.00 
Collateral 42,982 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00 
Number of lenders 42,982 7.46 7.74 1.00 161.00 
Performance provisions 42,982 0.15 0.36 0.00 1.00 
Number of covenants 42,982 0.54 1.10 0.00 7.00 
Number of participants 42,982 4.53 6.70 0.00 159.00 
Number of leads 42,982 2.94 3.30 1.00 40.00 
Bank share 42,958 28.68 24.51 0.00 100.00 
Syndicate Herfindahl 42,958 2,804.70 2,465.12 0.00 10,000.00 
Relationship lending 42,982 0.28 0.45 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending number 42,982 0.18 0.34 0.00 1.00 
Relationship lending amount 42,839 0.19 0.35 0.00 1.00 
Bank asset volatility 42,982 2.42 1.93 0.07 18.39 
RBC ratio 42,982 13.89 2.79 1.10 168.48 
Bank size 42,982 12.02 1.53 5.67 19.55 
Bank ROA 42,982 0.01 0.02 -0.02 0.30 
Bank NPLs 42,982 0.02 0.02 0.00 0.34 
Bank credit rating 36,835 -0.01 0.27 -1.00 1.00 
Bank rating category 36,835 -0.03 0.33 -1.00 1.00 
Firm size 42,946 7.29 1.95 0.03 24.13 
Firm ROA 42,791 0.11 0.06 -0.50 0.31 
Firm Tobin’s Q 42,855 0.45 0.20 -0.92 1.61 
Firm leverage 42,959 0.39 0.15 0.00 1.97 
GDP 41,963 0.21 1.57 -13.23 25.59 
GDP per capita 41,969 -2,082.12 11,978.34 -86,860.58 100,538.20 
Stock market capitalization 39,425 0.84 90.91 -1,158.55 1,201.18 
Interbank rate 39,443 -0.10 1.08 -33.53 6.77 
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Table 3. Baseline results with different fixed effects 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. 
The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different 
set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part of the table. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% 
level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -12.600** -20.278** -18.869** -56.023*** -52.449*** -51.769*** 
 
[-2.308] [-2.191] [-2.308] [-2.836] [-2.964] [-3.081] 
Loan amount -0.571 -0.564 -3.197*** -6.150*** -6.286*** -6.170*** 
 
[-0.876] [-0.865] [-4.467] [-3.861] [-3.901] [-3.884] 
Maturity 0.230*** 0.230*** 0.271** 1.222*** 1.201*** 1.211*** 
 
[2.907] [2.969] [2.389] [3.868] [3.835] [3.834] 
Collateral 15.046*** 15.066*** 20.345*** -13.471** -17.113** -16.859*** 
 
[3.533] [3.521] [15.304] [-2.098] [-2.704] [-2.771] 
Number of lenders -0.168 -0.161 0.438 -1.502*** -1.729*** -1.744*** 
 
[-0.228] [-0.225] [0.500] [-3.000] [-3.348] [-2.909] 
Performance provisions -24.905*** -24.603*** -21.280*** -24.388*** -24.253*** -23.342*** 
 
[-11.924] [-11.042] [-11.559] [-6.911] [-7.267] [-7.472] 
Number of covenants -1.364 -1.369 -1.322 4.606** 4.241* 3.643 
 
[-1.050] [-1.050] [-1.129] [2.248] [1.980] [1.669] 
Number of participants -0.470 -0.484 -0.803 0.545 0.770 0.769 
 
[-0.658] [-0.695] [-0.915] [0.843] [1.054] [0.959] 
Bank size -0.570*** -0.574*** -0.609*** -0.747** -0.738** -0.742** 
 
[-3.254] [-3.401] [-4.396] [-2.078] [-2.052] [-2.025] 
Bank ROA -89.837*** -88.533*** -81.669*** -132.123*** -130.667*** -130.751*** 
 
[-9.106] [-8.778] [-7.989] [-5.800] [-5.825] [-5.695] 
Bank NPLs 58.827** 59.934** 57.930** 175.391*** 174.259*** 171.781*** 
 
[2.619] [2.485] [2.263] [4.139] [4.197] [4.088] 
Firm size -100.418*** -100.440*** -92.923***    
 
[-30.795] [-30.806] [-44.527]    
Firm ROA -293.301*** -293.109*** -279.358***    
 
[-9.214] [-9.436] [-10.830]    
Firm Tobin’s Q -112.505*** -112.713*** -105.709***    
 
[-7.754] [-7.682] [-8.761]    
GDP growth -1.642*** -0.770 -0.902    
 
[-3.177] [-0.780] [-1.079]    
GDP per capita -0.000 -0.001 -0.001    
 
[-0.443] [-0.451] [-0.627]    
Stock market capitalization 0.017 0.041 0.025    
 
[0.245] [0.899] [0.457]    
Interbank rate 1.299 0.825 1.039    
 
[0.638] [0.326] [0.446]    
Constant 1,072.994*** 1,070.895*** 1,052.591*** 326.496*** 333.602*** 331.233*** 
 
[25.214] [26.124] [38.689] [9.639] [9.896] [9.716] 
Observations 52,038 52,015 52,011 42,982 42,982 42,982 
Adj. R-squared 0.849 0.849 0.860 0.743 0.745 0.746 
Year effects Y Y Y N N N 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm effects Y Y Y N N N 
Lender’s country × year effects N Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type effects N N Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects N N N Y Y Y 
Borrower’s country effects N N N N Y N 
Loan purpose effects N N N N Y Y 
Borrower’s country × year effects N N N N N Y 
Quarter effects N N N N N Y 
Number of banks 290 288 288 364 364 364 
Number of firms 11,250 11,242 11,241 10,255 10,255 10,255 
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Table 4. Distinguishing between positive and negative Portfolio risk differences 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes different combinations 
of Portfolio risk differences with its positive and negative values. In specification (1), the negative values of Portfolio risk differences 
(Negative risk differences) are included alongside Portfolio risk differences. In specification (2), the positive values of Portfolio risk 
differences (Positive risk differences) are included alongside Portfolio risk differences. In specification (3), the negative values of Portfolio 
risk differences (Negative risk differences) are included alongside the positive values of Portfolio risk differences (Positive risk 
differences). In specification (4), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Positive risk differences group, i.e., a binary variable equal 
to one for values of Portfolio risk differences above our sample mean, and zero otherwise. The lower part of the table denotes the type of 
fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Portfolio risk differences    50.849* 
 
   [1.882] 
Negative risk differences -41.843  -42.752  
 
[-0.985]  [-1.029]  
Positive risk differences  -58.404** -58.842**  
 
 [-2.102] [-2.144]  
Portfolio risk differences × 
Positive risk differences group    -114.232*** 
 
   [-3.202] 
Positive risk differences group    -25.005*** 
 
   [-2.908] 
Loan amount -6.288*** -6.278*** -6.284*** -6.279*** 
 
[-3.908] [-3.900] [-3.907] [-3.899] 
Maturity 1.201*** 1.200*** 1.201*** 1.200*** 
 
[3.835] [3.834] [3.834] [3.833] 
Collateral -17.174*** -17.129** -17.110** -17.184** 
 
[-2.730] [-2.688] [-2.697] [-2.695] 
Number of lenders -1.703*** -1.697*** -1.725*** -1.724*** 
 
[-3.333] [-3.242] [-3.356] [-3.407] 
Performance provisions -24.242*** -24.313*** -24.267*** -24.250*** 
 
[-7.280] [-7.333] [-7.313] [-7.344] 
Number of covenants 4.193* 4.212* 4.240* 4.253* 
 
[1.961] [1.951] [1.980] [1.985] 
Number of participants 0.750 0.738 0.766 0.758 
 
[1.058] [0.996] [1.057] [1.056] 
Bank size -0.734** -0.740** -0.739** -0.739** 
 
[-2.040] [-2.062] [-2.060] [-2.066] 
Bank ROA -130.703*** -130.872*** -130.705*** -130.745*** 
 
[-5.810] [-5.841] [-5.808] [-5.857] 
Bank NPLs 174.095*** 174.114*** 174.246*** 174.468*** 
 
[4.190] [4.192] [4.193] [4.198] 
Constant 334.407*** 344.507*** 335.757*** 362.279*** 
 
[8.953] [10.272] [8.952] [10.916] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 
Adj. R-squared 0.745 0.745 0.745 0.745 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 
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Table 5. Market-based vs regulatory measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a different combination 
of the market-based, the regulatory-based, and the market-regulatory differences measures. The lower part of the table denotes the type of 
fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Portfolio risk differences -27.620* -64.071***  -35.676** 
 
[-1.872] [-2.868]  [-2.127] 
Bank asset volatility -4.322  -6.060* -3.917 
 
[-1.042]  [-1.738] [-0.943] 
RBC ratio  -1.734** -0.305 -1.163 
 
 [-2.045] [-0.437] [-1.278] 
Loan amount -6.148*** -6.150*** -6.145*** -6.148*** 
 
[-3.859] [-3.861] [-3.861] [-3.858] 
Maturity 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 
 
[3.868] [3.867] [3.867] [3.868] 
Collateral -13.493** -13.498** -13.527** -13.509** 
 
[-2.100] [-2.100] [-2.108] [-2.102] 
Number of lenders -1.478*** -1.492*** -1.449*** -1.474*** 
 
[-2.949] [-2.957] [-2.932] [-2.928] 
Performance provisions -24.419*** -24.411*** -24.449*** -24.432*** 
 
[-6.915] [-6.943] [-6.932] [-6.937] 
Number of covenants 4.671** 4.644** 4.677** 4.691** 
 
[2.335] [2.284] [2.343] [2.347] 
Number of participants 0.525 0.533 0.499 0.520 
 
[0.815] [0.818] [0.791] [0.803] 
Bank size -0.745** -0.749** -0.743** -0.747** 
 
[-2.078] [-2.088] [-2.073] [-2.087] 
Bank ROA -132.148*** -132.115*** -132.222*** -132.140*** 
 
[-5.807] [-5.804] [-5.813] [-5.809] 
Bank NPLs 175.425*** 175.527*** 175.367*** 175.513*** 
 
[4.140] [4.150] [4.137] [4.150] 
Constant 341.961*** 349.107*** 355.298*** 355.679*** 
 
[11.464] [9.146] [9.925] [9.800] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 
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Table 6. Discrepancy between bank asset volatility and bank leverage 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 1. The 
estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. In all specifications Portfolio risk differences 
(leverage) is the residuals from the estimation of Equation (2) when RBC ratio is replaced by bank leverage, i.e., the sum of the bank 
long-term debt, short-term debt and current portion of long-term debt divided by the bank common equity. The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Portfolio risk differences (leverage) -30.231*** -59.315** -27.981***  -58.542** 
 
[-6.899] [-2.299] [-5.580]  [-2.638] 
Bank asset volatility  4.141  1.013 4.100 
 
 [1.176]  [0.461] [1.231] 
RBC ratio   -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 
 
  [-0.506] [-0.965] [-0.139] 
Loan amount -5.852*** -5.858*** -5.853*** -5.844*** -5.859*** 
 
[-4.389] [-4.378] [-4.386] [-4.386] [-4.377] 
Maturity 1.256*** 1.257*** 1.257*** 1.256*** 1.257*** 
 
[4.291] [4.290] [4.288] [4.288] [4.287] 
Collateral -14.490** -14.481** -14.481** -14.437** -14.479** 
 
[-2.229] [-2.226] [-2.228] [-2.220] [-2.226] 
Number of lenders -1.170*** -1.187** -1.164*** -1.143** -1.186*** 
 
[-2.740] [-2.695] [-2.737] [-2.662] [-2.707] 
Performance provisions -25.597*** -25.586*** -25.585*** -25.525*** -25.584*** 
 
[-8.501] [-8.514] [-8.466] [-8.352] [-8.480] 
Number of covenants 3.639 3.533 3.635 3.640 3.533 
 
[1.179] [1.173] [1.179] [1.193] [1.173] 
Number of participants 0.315 0.327 0.309 0.283 0.326 
 
[0.749] [0.747] [0.742] [0.678] [0.753] 
Bank size -0.698* -0.699* -0.697* -0.694* -0.699* 
 
[-1.983] [-1.992] [-1.975] [-1.960] [-1.987] 
Bank ROA -139.055*** -138.928*** -139.086*** -139.222*** -138.936*** 
 
[-4.926] [-4.946] [-4.924] [-4.920] [-4.942] 
Bank NPLs 159.605*** 159.227*** 159.548*** 159.534*** 159.218*** 
 
[4.544] [4.507] [4.539] [4.535] [4.505] 
Constant 326.391*** 311.101*** 327.701*** 330.196*** 311.536*** 
 
[11.672] [10.908] [11.808] [12.286] [11.579] 
Observations 50,503 50,503 50,503 50,503 50,503 
Adj. R-squared 0.737 0.737 0.737 0.737 0.737 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 461 461 461 461 461 
Number of firms 11,525 11,525 11,525 11,525 11,525 
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Table 7. Portfolio risk differences and bank characteristics 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. The lower part of the table denotes 
the type of fixed effects used in each specification. Each specification includes the interaction of Portfolio risk differences with a 
different loan-, bank-, and firm-level variable. In specification (1), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank size. In 
specification (2), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank ROA. In specification (3), Portfolio risk differences is 
interacted with Bank NPLs. In specification (4), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank credit rating, i.e., a categorical 
variable (from -1 to +1) reflecting the change in the bank’s credit rating (-1 is for a downgrade, +1 is for an upgrade, and 0 is for no 
change). In specification (5), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank credit rating category, i.e., a categorical variable 
(from -1 to +1) reflecting the change in the bank’s credit rating category (-1 is for a downgrade, +1 is for an upgrade, and 0 is for no 
change). The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Portfolio risk differences -76.165** -59.589*** -43.260** -40.531** -32.155* 
 
[-2.238] [-3.095] [-2.182] [-2.789] [-1.870] 
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank size 
1.706     
[1.127]     
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank ROA 
 347.348***    
 [3.761]    
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank NPLs 
  -561.078***   
  [-3.872]   
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank credit rating 
   50.193**  
   [2.328]  
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank credit rating category 
    57.930* 
    [1.956] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,982 36,677 36,677 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.742 0.742 0.734 0.734 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 159 159 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,255 8,750 8,750 
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Table 8. Lending relationships 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are 
defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. 
Each specification includes a different set of fixed effects, as given in the lower part of the table. In specification 
(1), we interact Portfolio risk differences with Relationship lending, i.e., a binary variable equal to 1 for a prior 
lending relationship between the lender and the borrower during the previous 5-year period, and zero otherwise. 
In specification (2), we interact Portfolio risk differences with Relationship lending number, i.e., the ratio of the 
number of prior loans between the lender and the borrower during the previous 5-year period to the total number 
of loans received by the borrower during the same period. In specification (3), we interact Portfolio risk 
differences with Relationship lending amount, i.e., the ratio of the amount of prior loans between the lender and 
the borrower during the previous 5-year period to the total amount of loans received by the borrower during the 
same period. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Portfolio risk differences -63.889*** -62.213*** -60.108*** 
 [-3.088] [-3.133] [-3.216] 
Portfolio risk differences × Relationship lending 32.142***   
 [3.828]   
Portfolio risk differences × Relationship lending number  58.610***  
 
 [4.544]  
Portfolio risk differences × Relationship lending amount   51.067*** 
 
  [4.099] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,839 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.742 
Full set of controls Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,238 
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Table 9. The syndicate’s structure 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in 
Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Different specifications 
include the interaction of Portfolio risk differences with measures of the syndicate’s structure. In specification (1), Portfolio 
risk differences is interacted with Number of lenders. In specification (2), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Number 
of participants. In specification (3), Portfolio risk differences is interacted with Bank share. In specification (4), Portfolio 
risk differences is interacted with Syndicate Herfindahl. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in 
each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Portfolio risk differences -78.309*** -67.712*** -72.744*** -72.628*** 
 
[-2.964] [-3.626] [-4.600] [-4.548] 
Portfolio risk differences × 
Number of lenders 
3.220*    
[1.833]    
Portfolio risk differences × 
Number of leads 
 4.455***   
 [3.327]   
Portfolio risk differences × 
Bank share 
  -2.371***  
  [-6.400]  
Portfolio risk differences × 
Syndicate Herfindahl 
   -0.024*** 
   [-6.120] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,948 42,948 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.744 0.744 
Full set of controls Y Y Y Y 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Loan purpose Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 363 363 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,247 10,247 
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Internet Appendix 
 
 
 
Abstract 
The first section includes information on the construction of the sample and additional 
summary statistics and the results from the OLS regression for the estimation of the regulatory-
market differences measure. The second section reports (i) estimates from the regression for 
the construction of our market-regulatory portfolio risk differences measure, (ii) estimates from 
our baseline regressions with different assumptions about standard error-clustering, (iii) results 
from specifications with alternative portfolio risk differences measures, (iv) weighted 
regressions, (v) estimates from the Heckman regressions, and (vi) the examination of the role 
of monetary policy. 
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Table A1. Number of loans and mean and standard deviation of Portfolio risk differences by lender’s 
country 
The table reports the number of observations (loan facilities), and the mean and standard deviation of Portfolio risk differences 
by lender’s country. 
Country Obs. 
Mean of  
Portfolio risk differences 
Std. Dev. of 
Portfolio risk differences 
Australia 947 -0.11 0.14 
Austria 31 -0.25 0.08 
Belgium 53 -0.23 0.10 
Brazil 2 0.39 0.00 
Canada 3,169 -0.25 0.07 
China 210 -0.24 0.14 
Czech Republic 4 0.44 0.09 
Denmark 44 -0.35 0.10 
Finland 7 -0.21 0.04 
France 2,547 -0.29 0.07 
Germany 2,842 -0.36 0.06 
Greece 26 0.21 0.41 
Hong Kong 345 -0.08 0.21 
India 171 -0.10 0.19 
Indonesia 2 2.12 0.00 
Ireland 7 -0.46 0.08 
Italy 284 -0.10 0.18 
Japan 540 -0.29 0.08 
Macau 5 -0.28 0.02 
Malaysia 47 -0.12 0.16 
Mexico 14 -0.13 0.09 
Netherlands 410 -0.25 0.06 
New Zealand 4 0.45 0.00 
Norway 224 -0.24 0.10 
Philippines 2 0.59 0.00 
Poland 12 1.07 0.66 
Portugal 6 -0.09 0.05 
Russia 18 -0.34 0.09 
Saudi Arabia 19 0.64 0.48 
Singapore 149 -0.12 0.23 
South Africa 2 -0.17 0.00 
South Korea 25 -0.30 0.19 
Spain 807 -0.15 0.17 
Sweden 107 -0.33 0.10 
Switzerland 2,580 -0.41 0.09 
Taiwan 856 -0.22 0.11 
Thailand 11 -0.04 0.08 
Turkey 8 -0.11 0.23 
United Arab Emirates 4 -0.35 0.00 
United Kingdom 3,499 -0.21 0.18 
United States of America 22,942 -0.11 0.20 
Total 42,982   
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Table A2. OLS of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from the regression 
of Bank asset volatility on RBC ratio at the bank-year level. In specification 
(1), the estimation method is OLS with constant. In specification (2), the 
estimation method is OLS without constant. The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) 
RBC ratio 0.027*** 0.032*** 
 
(5.897) (18.336) 
Constant 0.083  
 (1.185)  
Observations 2,221 2,221 
Adj. R-squared 0.015 0.131 
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Table A3. Different loan controls 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables 
are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and 
bank. Different specifications include different loan controls to show that the estimates on the variable 
Portfolio risk differences are not overly sensitive to the loan controls used. The lower part of the table denotes 
the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Portfolio risk differences -48.658** -53.363** -51.784*** -46.260** 
 
[-2.579] [-2.491] [-2.826] [-2.616] 
Loan amount  -6.936***   
 
 [-4.456]   
Maturity  1.221***   
 
 [3.880]   
Collateral   -15.556**  
 
  [-2.182]  
Number of lenders   -1.016  
 
  [-1.666]  
Performance provisions    -27.192*** 
 
   [-8.547] 
Number of covenants    2.192 
 
   [0.699] 
Number of participants   -0.161  
 
  [-0.193]  
Bank size -0.888*** -0.783** -0.871*** -0.874** 
 
[-2.804] [-2.278] [-2.768] [-2.603] 
Bank ROA -142.306*** -133.713*** -141.426*** -140.871*** 
 
[-7.305] [-6.033] [-7.052] [-7.227] 
Bank NPLs 188.979*** 176.333*** 187.395*** 188.213*** 
 
[4.277] [4.153] [4.271] [4.259] 
Constant 272.274*** 324.833*** 288.068*** 275.473*** 
 
[63.760] [9.115] [39.574] [61.184] 
Observations 43,948 42,982 43,948 43,948 
Adj. R-squared 0.726 0.741 0.727 0.727 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 369 369 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,415 10,415 
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Table A4. Different clustering of standard errors 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification and the 
last line of the table denotes the type of standard error clustering (LC&Y refers to Lender’s country and Year, B&Y refers to 
Bank and Year, B&F refers to Bank and Firm: LC&B&Y refers to Lender’s country and Bank and Year, B&F&Y refers to Bank 
and Firm and Year, LC&BC&Y refers to Lender’s country and Borrower’s country and Year). The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -56.023*** -56.023*** -56.023* -56.023*** -56.023*** -56.023*** 
 
[-6.454] [-3.025] [-1.682] [-6.454] [-3.010] [-4.619] 
Loan amount -6.150*** -6.150*** -6.150*** -6.150*** -6.150*** -6.150** 
 
[-4.412] [-4.509] [-4.420] [-4.412] [-4.449] [-2.924] 
Maturity 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 
 
[4.195] [6.117] [6.846] [4.195] [6.098] [3.389] 
Collateral -13.471* -13.471* -13.471** -13.471* -13.471* -13.471 
 
[-1.950] [-2.084] [-2.433] [-1.950] [-2.080] [-1.734] 
Number of lenders -1.502 -1.502 -1.502 -1.502 -1.502 -1.502 
 
[-0.826] [-1.269] [-1.487] [-0.826] [-1.233] [-1.283] 
Performance provisions -24.388*** -24.388*** -24.388*** -24.388*** -24.388*** -24.388*** 
 
[-6.166] [-4.949] [-5.971] [-6.166] [-4.924] [-6.064] 
Number of covenants 4.606 4.606* 4.606* 4.606 4.606* 4.606** 
 
[1.658] [1.927] [1.775] [1.658] [1.915] [2.720] 
Number of participants 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.545 
 
[0.257] [0.423] [0.531] [0.257] [0.415] [0.513] 
Bank size -0.747 -0.747* -0.747** -0.747 -0.747* -0.747 
 
[-1.652] [-1.831] [-2.303] [-1.652] [-1.831] [-1.382] 
Bank ROA -132.123*** -132.123*** -132.123*** -132.123*** -132.123*** -132.123*** 
 
[-8.478] [-6.196] [-5.082] [-8.478] [-6.161] [-9.138] 
Bank NPLs 175.391*** 175.391*** 175.391*** 175.391*** 175.391*** 175.391*** 
 
[5.463] [5.612] [5.538] [5.463] [5.601] [8.647] 
Constant 326.496*** 326.496*** 326.496*** 326.496*** 326.496*** 326.496*** 
 
[12.161] [11.725] [11.571] [12.161] [11.598] [12.676] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Clustering LC&Y B&Y B&F LC&B&Y B&F&Y LC&BC&Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 
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Table A5 Different Portfolio risk differences measures 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The Dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a 
variation of Portfolio risk differences. Portfolio risk differences (EMU-adjusted) is the measure calculated when a common risk-
free rate for all countries of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) is employed in Equation (4). Portfolio risk differences 
(OLS w/o constant) is the measure calculated when the OLS in Equation (2) is estimated without a constant. Portfolio risk 
differences (unstandardized) is the measure calculated when the residuals from the OLS in Equation (2) are not standardized. 
Portfolio risk differences (OLS by bank) is the measure calculated when the OLS in Equation (2) is estimated for each lender 
separately. The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote 
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (3) 
Portfolio risk differences (EMU-adjusted) -56.020***    
 
[-2.836]    
Portfolio risk differences (OLS w/o constant)  -53.892***   
 
 [-2.852]   
Portfolio risk differences (unstandardized)   -44.523***  
 
  [-2.836]  
Portfolio risk differences (OLS by bank)    -44.000** 
 
   [-2.632] 
Loan amount -6.150*** -6.150*** -6.150*** -6.149*** 
 
[-3.861] [-3.862] [-3.861] [-3.860] 
Maturity 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 
 
[3.868] [3.868] [3.868] [3.868] 
Collateral -13.471** -13.469** -13.471** -13.481** 
 
[-2.098] [-2.098] [-2.098] [-2.098] 
Number of lenders -1.502*** -1.502*** -1.502*** -1.506*** 
 
[-3.000] [-3.001] [-3.000] [-3.016] 
Performance provisions -24.388*** -24.386*** -24.388*** -24.398*** 
 
[-6.911] [-6.907] [-6.911] [-6.930] 
Number of covenants 4.606** 4.599** 4.606** 4.613** 
 
[2.248] [2.242] [2.248] [2.262] 
Number of participants 0.545 0.545 0.545 0.549 
 
[0.843] [0.845] [0.843] [0.847] 
Bank size -0.747** -0.747** -0.747** -0.748** 
 
[-2.078] [-2.077] [-2.078] [-2.078] 
Bank ROA -132.123*** -132.129*** -132.123*** -132.147*** 
 
[-5.800] [-5.800] [-5.800] [-5.804] 
Bank NPLs 175.391*** 175.368*** 175.391*** 175.464*** 
 
[4.139] [4.138] [4.139] [4.144] 
Constant 326.509*** 327.450*** 326.497*** 335.922*** 
 
[9.639] [9.691] [9.639] [10.105] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 
Loan type Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 
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Table A6. Weighted regressions 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). The dependent variable is AISD and all variables are defined in Table 
1. The estimation method is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Each specification includes a 
different weight. In specification (1), we weight by the number of loans between the lender’s country and the borrower’s country 
to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification (2), we employ the weight of specification (1) at the yearly frequency. 
In specification (3), we weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower’s country to the total number of loans 
in our sample. In specification (4), we employ the weight of specification (3) at the yearly frequency. In specification (5), we 
weight by the number of loans between the lender and the borrower to the total number of loans in our sample. In specification 
(6), we employ the weight of specification (5) at the yearly frequency. The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 
10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Portfolio risk differences -56.273*** -56.258*** -56.118*** -55.270*** -55.965*** -56.419*** 
 [-2.824] [-2.822] [-2.821] [-2.757] [-2.807] [-2.871] 
Loan amount -6.153*** -6.152*** -6.155*** -6.144*** -6.151*** -6.159*** 
 [-3.866] [-3.866] [-3.867] [-3.855] [-3.860] [-3.860] 
Maturity 1.221*** 1.221*** 1.221*** 1.222*** 1.222*** 1.221*** 
 [3.869] [3.869] [3.868] [3.868] [3.868] [3.866] 
Collateral -13.517** -13.506** -13.566** -13.593** -13.476** -13.407** 
 [-2.095] [-2.095] [-2.107] [-2.099] [-2.094] [-2.083] 
Number of lenders -1.519*** -1.517*** -1.528*** -1.519*** -1.502*** -1.484*** 
 [-3.020] [-3.019] [-3.040] [-3.053] [-2.994] [-2.980] 
Performance provisions -24.371*** -24.372*** -24.365*** -24.373*** -24.388*** -24.383*** 
 [-6.929] [-6.927] [-6.932] [-6.933] [-6.911] [-6.899] 
Number of covenants 4.594** 4.597** 4.573** 4.558** 4.601** 4.693** 
 [2.233] [2.235] [2.230] [2.222] [2.242] [2.246] 
Number of participants 0.565 0.563 0.57 0.562 0.545 0.529 
 [0.877] [0.874] [0.887] [0.883] [0.843] [0.831] 
Bank size -0.747** -0.747** -0.746** -0.745** -0.747** -0.747** 
 [-2.079] [-2.078] [-2.080] [-2.072] [-2.078] [-2.087] 
Bank ROA -131.881*** -131.917*** -131.947*** -132.033*** -132.105*** -131.941*** 
 [-5.790] [-5.791] [-5.792] [-5.784] [-5.799] [-5.820] 
Bank NPLs 175.408*** 175.423*** 175.311*** 175.166*** 175.380*** 175.423*** 
 [4.134] [4.134] [4.133] [4.131] [4.139] [4.141] 
Constant 331.602*** 331.172*** 331.047*** 330.160*** 326.312*** 330.417*** 
 [10.798] [10.837] [9.966] [10.156] [9.740] [9.277] 
Observations 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 42,982 
Adj. R-squared 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 0.743 
Loan type Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y Y Y Y Y 
Number of banks 364 364 364 364 364 364 
Number of firms 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 10,255 
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Table A7. Heckman sample-selection model 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets) from Heckman’s (1979) 
sample-selection model. The dependent variable is in the second line of each panel and 
all variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method in Panel A is maximum 
likelihood and in Panel B it is OLS with standard errors clustered by lender’s country and 
bank. Specifications (1) and (2) of Panel A report the estimates from the first-stage probit 
model for the determinants of the firm’s loan-taking decision. The lower part of Panel A 
denotes the dummy variables used in each specification. Panel B reports the estimates of 
the second-stage OLS regression for the effect of Portfolio risk differences on loan 
spreads. Each of the specifications in Panel B includes the inverse Mills ratio (Lambda) 
from the corresponding specification in Panel A. The lower part of Panel B denotes the 
type of fixed effects used in each specification. The *, **, and *** denote statistical 
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
 
Panel A: The firm’s loan-taking decision 
 
 
(1) 
Loan deal 
(2) 
Loan deal 
Loan amount -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 [-7.630] [-7.618] 
Maturity 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 [15.359] [15.352] 
Collateral 0.268*** 0.268*** 
 [32.828] [32.791] 
Number of lenders 0.015*** 0.015*** 
 [10.857] [10.873] 
Performance provisions 0.104*** 0.104*** 
 [8.466] [8.488] 
Number of covenants -0.051*** -0.051*** 
 [-13.497] [-13.473] 
Number of participants -0.003* -0.003* 
 [-1.763] [-1.779] 
Bank size  -0.003 
 
 [-1.168] 
Bank ROA  -0.463*** 
 
 [-2.772] 
Bank NPLs  0.075 
 
 [0.483] 
Firm size 0.011*** 0.011*** 
 [5.182] [5.288] 
Firm ROA -0.123** -0.122** 
 [-2.002] [-1.984] 
Firm Tobin’s Q 0.112*** 0.113*** 
 [6.115] [6.145] 
Firm leverage 0.242*** 0.241*** 
 [9.219] [9.178] 
Constant -207.691*** -207.593*** 
  [-123.219] [-123.131] 
Observations 167,721 167,721 
Loan type dummies Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
Firm dummies Y Y 
Borrower’s country dummies Y Y 
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Panel B: The effect of Portfolio risk differences on loan spreads 
 
 
(1) 
AISD 
(2) 
AISD 
Portfolio risk differences -64.709*** -64.197*** 
 [-4.817] [-4.931] 
Loan amount -42.225*** -44.473*** 
 [-4.710] [-4.746] 
Maturity 3.972*** 4.145*** 
 [4.382] [4.448] 
Collateral 431.701*** 459.437*** 
 [3.646] [3.724] 
Number of lenders 21.467*** 22.958*** 
 [3.146] [3.217] 
Performance provisions 152.206*** 164.035*** 
 [3.402] [3.504] 
Number of covenants -78.015*** -83.136*** 
 [-3.504] [-3.590] 
Number of participants -2.459 -2.679 
 [-1.418] [-1.481] 
Bank size -0.772** -5.720*** 
 [-2.113] [-3.630] 
Bank ROA -115.165*** -942.858*** 
 [-4.988] [-4.480] 
Bank NPLs 157.611*** 290.632*** 
 [3.994] [4.538] 
Lambda 2,413.047*** 2,566.640*** 
 [3.631] [3.702] 
Constant -2,052.194*** -2,139.723*** 
  [-3.035] [-3.113] 
Observations 42,631 42,631 
Loan type Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y 
Number of banks 362 362 
Number of firms 10,195 10,195 
57 
 
Table A8. The effect of monetary policy 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in brackets). Dependent variable is AISD 
and all variables are defined in Table 1. The estimation method is OLS with standard 
errors clustered by lender’s country and bank. Specifications (1) and (2) include the 
interaction of Portfolio risk differences with Discount rate, i.e., the discount rate in the 
lender’s country at the monthly (specification 1) and the annual frequency (specification 
2). The lower part of the table denotes the type of fixed effects used in each specification. 
The *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, 
respectively. 
 
(1) (2) 
Portfolio risk differences -80.751*** -80.265*** 
 
[-18.744] [-18.738] 
Portfolio risk differences × Discount rate 24.380*** 24.794*** 
 
[19.695] [17.754] 
Discount rate -22.101*** -20.082*** 
 
[-54.506] [-35.059] 
Loan amount -6.964*** -6.972*** 
 
[-16.134] [-16.433] 
Maturity 0.996*** 0.995*** 
 
[7.340] [7.349] 
Collateral -11.821*** -11.657*** 
 
[-3.425] [-3.394] 
Number of lenders -4.059* -4.063* 
 
[-2.091] [-2.092] 
Performance provisions -21.412*** -21.369*** 
 
[-70.591] [-69.751] 
Number of covenants 4.410*** 4.355*** 
 
[12.293] [12.144] 
Number of participants 3.351 3.353 
 
[1.741] [1.741] 
Bank size -0.212 -0.207 
 
[-0.880] [-0.882] 
Bank ROA -157.524*** -157.066*** 
 
[-5.549] [-5.741] 
Bank NPLs 142.781*** 141.830*** 
 
[14.192] [14.481] 
Constant 406.610*** 402.089*** 
 
[48.672] [47.251] 
Observations 23,786 23,788 
Adj. R-squared 0.738 0.738 
Loan type Y Y 
Bank effects Y Y 
Firm × year effects Y Y 
Lender’s country × year effects Y Y 
Number of banks 176 176 
Number of firms 6,234 6,235 
 
 
 
